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ABSTRACT 
This paper uses time series empirical data on six key indicators of financial liberalization 
in Poland to explore the linkage between financial liberalization and economic growth.  
We begin with a survey of the financial liberalization process and then use monthly 
empirical data covering the period 1990-2002 to examine the linkages between financial 
liberalization and economic development. The results of our study indicate that not only 
is there evidence of a long run positive linkage between financial liberalization and 
economic growth but also that there is strong evidence to indicate that the direction of 
causation runs from the former to the latter and not vice-versa. Evidence from all six of 
the financial indicators (Turnover, Capitalization, narrow money M0, broad money M2, 
Depth and Share Prices) indicates that they raise industrial production while the latter 
causes financial development in only two of the cases.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the effects of financial and stock market liberalization on 
economic activity in Poland.  We have chosen Poland for our analysis not only because it 
is one of the most important transition economies in the world, but also because the 
financial sector has undergone major changes since the late 1980s in a bid to become a 
more market-based economy. The country is also a likely early candidate for entry into 
the European Union and by population and the size of its economy by far the most 
important potential new member. In addition, Poland along with Hungary have been the 
two economies cited by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development as being 
in the lead when it comes to financial sector reform. 
The relationship between financial development indicators and economic growth 
has received a considerable attention in recent empirical literature. Many authors have 
demonstrated that the development of the financial system has a positive effect on the 
rate of economic growth and/or the volume and/or efficiency of investment eg: Fry 
(1997). McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), and later authors such as Kapur (1976); 
Mathesion (1980) and Fry (1989 and 1997) have presented the theoretical background of 
this relationship. The main policy implication of the McKinnon/Shaw framework is that 
government restrictions on the financial sector such as interest rate ceilings, high reserve 
requirements and directed credit policies distort the process of financial development and 
reduce economic growth. The endogenous growth literature that incorporates both 
endogenous growth and endogenous financial institutions shows similar results. Financial 
intermediation is now modeled explicitly. These models suggest that financial 
intermediation has a positive effect on economic growth, see for example, Greenwood 
and Jovanovic (1990) and King and Levine (1993b) argue that government intervention 
in the banking system reduces the growth rate of an economy. By contrast, a small but 
growing literature such as Van Winjnbergen (1983) and  Stiglitz, (1994) emphasize that 
financial market imperfections, such as, asymmetric information and imperfect 
competition means that’s financial liberalization can have a negative effect on economic 
growth. 
Although the recent studies seem to confirm a positive association between 
financial development and economic growth, they do not establish the direction of 
causality between financial development and economic growth. As McKinnon (1988) 
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puts it, ‘What is the cause and what is the effect? Is finance a leading sector in economic 
development, or does it simply follow growth in real output which is generated 
elsewhere?’ In this paper, we examine the question of the causality of the relationship 
between financial liberalization and economic growth using time series data from Poland. 
The aim of this paper is to establish whether or not cointegrating relationship among 
industrial production and financial development indicators exist, and then to investigate 
the direction of causality. The use of time series data contrasts to the existing empirical 
literature such of King and Levine (1993a) which concentrates on using cross sectional 
and cross-country studies. The paper is constructed as follows; we firstly document the 
key changes in the Polish financial system and since 1989, we then proceed to describe 
the data, the econometric methodology, and the empirical results for stationarity, 
cointegration and causality. The final section presents our conclusions. 
 
2. The Polish Financial Sector 
2.1. Financial Liberalization in Poland 
In the early 1990s, a new financial infrastructure was built (with its laws and institutions) 
in Poland as an integral part of moving the country towards a market-based economy. 
Part of the process of liberalization involved the privatization of much of the financial 
sectors itself. The rapid development of the financial sector played an important role in 
mitigating the recession of the early transition stage. In 1993 the government adopted a 
restructuring program for the banking sector that included recapitalization of  the banking 
system. Also financial sector played a key role in general privatization process 
undertaken in the economy.  
The financial sector’s transformation was based on legislation passed in the late 
1980s: the National Bank of Poland Act and the Banking Act passed by the Parliament in 
1989. These two acts created the base for two-tier banking system of state owned and 
private banks and also allowed for the introduction of competition in banking and 
finance. The four main elements of the financial system in Poland are: central banking, 
commercial banking, the financial markets, and the development of non-depository 
financial intermediary institutions.  
 4
2.2. The National Bank of Poland 
Up until 1988 the National Bank of Poland (NBP) was the main and only deposit 
accepting institution under the central planning system. In 1989 the building of the 
foundations of a market economy began and in 1990 the NBP became a fully autonomous 
entity. The NBP’s tasks and the shape of the banking system are specified in Article 227 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the changes that began in 1989 in central 
banking are summarized in the National Bank of Poland Act, passed by the Parliament on 
29th of August 1997. The Act granted the NPB independence in conducting the monetary 
policy, and introduced two new institutions responsible for monetary policy and banking 
supervision: the Monetary Policy Council (Rada Polityki Pienieznej - RPP) and the 
Banking Supervision Commission (Komisja Nadzoru Bankowego - KNB). The National 
Bank of Poland – the NBP has a sole right of issuing currency and is responsible is 
responsible for the financial stability of the banking system as whole. It also has a 
supervisory role over the commercial banks, mainly to ensure proper compliance with the 
provision of banking laws. The NBP organizes the system of monetary clearing, current 
interbank settlements and participates in the interbank money market to ensure sufficient 
liquidity for the financial system. It also perform regulatory functions with regards to 
commercial banks, ensures the safety of banks and deposits placed with them, and 
maintains liquidity in the banking sector. The NBP also acts as the lender of last resort, 
when banks face temporary liquidity problems. In addition, the NBP provides banking 
services to the State budget, operates accounts of the government and other state 
institutions, targets State funds and the State budget entities, and executes their payment 
orders. 
The President of the NBP is appointed by the Parliament at the request of the 
President of the Republic of Poland, for a six-year term. The President chairs the 
Monetary Policy Council, the NBP Management Board, and the Commission for Banking 
Supervision. The Monetary Policy Council has nine members, three appointed by the 
State President, and six chosen by both houses of Parliament (the Sejm and the Senate). 
Every year, the council determines monetary policy guidelines and basic principles for it 
pursuit. The basic tasks of the NBP Management Board are the implementation of 
resolutions of the Monetary Policy Council, implementation of the NBP plan of activity, 
and execution of a budget, approved by the MPC. 
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Since the beginning of the transformation process in Poland, the main objective of 
the monetary policy was to reduce inflation. The NBP conducts monetary policy using 
the a combination of instruments such as (i) reserve requirements (ii) the use of a real 
interest rate policy and (iii) the use of open market operations which began in 1993, and 
by the late 1990s became the basic tool of central bank intervention. The Medium-Term 
Monetary Strategy for 1999-2003 reaffirmed that open market operations will remain 
important in the future.  
 
2.3. Commercial Banking 
Commercialization of the banking system was first permitted by the 1988 banking law 
and led to major changes in the 1989-92 period. Three state owned banks: Powszechna 
Kasa Oszczednosci Bank Panstwowy – PKO BP, Bank Handlowy SA, and PEKAO SA 
became were separated from the NBP. The regional branches of the NBP became 
independent, establishing nine new state owned regional banks. Later they were 
transformed into joint stock companies owned by the Treasury. More state owned banks 
were set up: Bank Rozwoju Eksportu SA – BRE, Bank Inicjatyw Gospodarczych – BIG 
SA, Polski Bank Rozwoju – PBR SA. They were owned by the Treasury, state owned 
enterprises (SOEs), and government agencies. Several hundred small private banks 
emerged due to liberalization of entry regulations 
 The initial state of the Polish Banking system following the process of reform 
was quite perilous, exacerbated by a recession in the early 1990s and the inevitable 
problems faced by many companies in the move to a more market based system. 
According to Tang  et al (2000) Non Performing loans as a percentage of total loans rose 
from 16% in 1991 to a peak of 29% in 1994 and 28% in 1995 before a rapid 
improvement down to 10% in 1998. In 1992 Poland revised the Banking Law giving the 
central bank, the National Bank of Poland the authority to enforce provisioning 
requirements, capital adequacy and exposure limits. Poland experienced bank crises 
(1992-93) due to a general insolvency in the banking sector. To deal with it prudential 
regulations were introduced in 1993-95, and then tightened in 1998. In 1993 the Capital 
Adequacy Ratio standard set by the Bank for International Settlements BIS was 
introduced, and in 1994 International Accounting Standard IAS were taken on board. 
Most of the banks were recapitalized using funds raised from the issuance of 15 year 
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governments bonds. In 1998 the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) conducted a ranking of extensiveness and effectiveness of financial laws and 
regulations, Hungary came in first getting 4 out of 4 in both categories, closely followed 
by Poland scoring  4 for extensiveness, and 3 for effectiveness . 
Under Polish banking law, banks can take on three legal forms: state banks, co-
operative banks, and joint stock companies. In 1999 only two state-owned banks were not 
transformed into joint stock companies: PKO BP and Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego – 
BGK. Most of the banks take the form of co-operatives but their market share is relatively 
insignificant (4.3% of total sector net assets in 1998). Joint stock companies, with state, 
foreign, and domestic private capital shares, are by far the most important institutions 
within the banking sector. Changes in the ownership structure of the banking sector over 
the 1993-98 period are shown in Table 1. 
Banking  privatization began in Poland in 1991, but it was not until 1998 that the 
sector could be formally called private, with a share of private and co-operative banks 
exceeding 50% in total assets of the banking sector (see Table 1). The privatization of 
state-owned banks started in 1991-93 when banks such as BIG, BRE, Wielkopolski Bank 
Kredytowy – WBK, and Bank Slaski – BSK were privatized. At the time the privatization 
approach aimed at selling a block of shares (50–60%) in an initial public offering (IPO) 
to domestic and foreign investors, giving some shares to bank employees (5–7%), and 
retaining a controlling stake (20 – 30%). This sell-off strategy was necessary (Gorski, 
2001) as banks found themselves in difficult situation due to a high proportion of bad 
loans in their portfolios (3). The IPO sales of privatized banks’ shares with a pre-set price 
usually ended up with high reductions in the number of shares sold to investors as 
compared to the numbers ordered.  
From 1993 onwards share offer prices were set by tender or at a special stock 
exchange session. Foreign investors were encouraged to get involved in banks’ 
privatization through the issue of Global Depository Receipts (GDRs) and American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs). In the second half of the 1990s banks ‘consolidation’ 
accompanied the privatization process, the three remaining regional state-owned banks 
were incorporated into the structure of the Pekao SA Bank. Following an initiative of the 
central bank and the Banking Guarantee Fund, an incentive scheme was developed to 
encourage banks that were doing well to take over banks on the verge of bankruptcy by 
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offering partial or complete exemption from obligatory reserve requirements. The NBP 
encouraged domestic banks to purchase the remaining Treasury shares in banks, for 
example,  BIG SA was encouraged to buy into Bank Gdanski and Kredyt Bank SA was 
encouraged to buy into Polski Bank Investycyjny. The NBP promoted both voluntary 
mergers and hostile takeovers of domestic private banks, for example, the acquisition of a 
small listed bank- Polski Bank Rozwoju SA by the larger Bank Rozwoju Eksportu (BRE), 
and later in mid 1999 merger of the BRE with Bank Handlowy (BWH). Consolidation of 
the Polish banking sector continues with foreign capital becoming more and more 
involved. 
By mid 1999, the foreign capital accounted for more than 50% of shareholders’ 
funds of banks operating in Poland. This happened because 53% of the shares of the 
second largest bank in Poland - PeKaO SA were sold to UniCredito Italiano, and 80% of 
the equity of the tenth largest bank – Bank Zachodni to the Irish AIB plc. Over 1993-99 
foreign capital entered the Polish banking system in (Gorski, 2001) significant way. The 
main reason behind the decisions of foreign investors to enter Polish banking was a 
positive assessment of progress achieved in economic transformation, together with 
encouraging economic prospects, including Poland’s anticipated EU accession. 
 
2.4. The Capital Markets 
Two legal Acts were responsible for setting the scene for capital markets development in 
Poland in the early 1990s: the 1991 Acts on the commercialization and privatization of 
state-owned companies and the law on public trading in securities and in trust funds. In 
particular, the second law permitted the establishment of institutions necessary for the 
operations of a Polish capital market based on western patterns. These institutions 
include: The Securities and Stock Exchange Commission (Komisja Papierow 
Wartosciowych i Gield – KPWiG),  the agency responsible for whether securities can be 
publicly traded, including admission procedures to the Stock Exchange, granting of 
brokerage and investment advisor licences, supervision of the stock market, protecting 
investors’ interests and ensuring fair competition; 
The Warsaw Stock Exchange, WSE (Warszawska Gielda Papierow Wartosciowych 
– WGPW) is the only stock exchange in Poland, on which shares, pre-emption rights, 
treasury and corporate bonds, foreign exchange, and stock exchange index derivatives are 
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traded. At the end of 1997 some 47 Brokerages operated in Poland, with 16 directly 
owned by banks. In 1996 an over-the-counter (OTC) market (Centralna Tabele Ofert – 
CeTO) was established as a public market separate from the Stock Exchange. 
The development level of a stock exchange can be measured through the market 
value of quoted companies (market capitalization). At the end of 1998, the WSE 
capitalization exceeded $20.5 billion or around 14% of Poland’s GDP (Czekaj & Owsiak, 
1999). This number is very important, since at the end of 1997, the capitalization 
accounted only for 5-6% of GDP.  In 1999 the shares of six Polish companies were 
trading as Global Depository Receipts in London. In anticipation of future EU accession 
competition has began between Central European exchanges: Prague, Vienna, Budapest 
and Warsaw for the regional leadership in the capital market. Gorski (2001) argues that in 
near future alliances will emerge between these centers. The Warsaw Stock Exchange 
also considers trading shares of companies from other Eastern European countries: 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Ukraine. 
  
The second major supplier of tradable securities to the stock exchange is the State 
Treasury. In 1997 Treasury bonds represented almost 20% of the entire value of turnover 
on the Exchange. Investor’s interest in the bonds has grown together with their 
development over longer maturity periods (from 1 to 10 years) and in variety (e.g. 
variable and fixed yield bonds). In the early 1990s state Treasury instruments dominated 
the bond sector, and from 1996 corporate bonds started to appear. The relatively late 
introduction of corporate bonds was partly the result of non-existence of appropriate legal 
regulations and partly the due to persistently high inflation, which made it difficult to 
calculate future returns. However, by the end of 1990s the bond market has become an 
attractive source of capital for many companies. 
 
The municipal sector also issues bonds but because it is situated at the lowest 
level of local authority structure, the value of bonds issued is not very high. The highest 
issues run at a level of around $6 million and the bonds issued by the municipal sector are 
generally not even publicly traded publicly.  At the turn of the century, Treasury paper 
and shares dominated the Polish capital market only towards the mid 1990s did other 
financial instruments such as  corporate bonds, municipal bonds and derivatives emerge.  
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 2.5. Non Deposit Accepting Institutions 
Non Deposit Accepting Institutions in Poland are dominated by the Pension Funds and 
Insurance companies with a negligible role for Investment Banks or Open Ended or 
Closed Investment Funds. Pension funds began to be established in Poland only in 1999. 
The pension system assumes that employees can be insured under three pillars: Pillar I, 
an obligatory insurance in the state Zaklad Ubezpieczen Spolecznych (ZUS), to which 
15% of pension premiums go; Pillar II, an obligatory insurance in open pension funds, 
managed by Powszechne Towarzystwo Emerytalne SA (PTE), and which gets 9% of 
premiums;  Pillar III, voluntary private employee pension fund. In the first half of 1999 
21 PTE companies were granted licenses from the Pension Funds Supervision Office. By 
mid 1999 the market leaders were established, with a combined market share of 70%: 
four pension funds established by Commercial Union, the banks BHP SA and WBK SA; 
PZU Zycie; Nationale Nederlanden; and Norwich Union. 
At the end of 1998, 55 insurance companies operated in Poland, of which 24, 
conducted businesses in life assurance. The capital raised by insurance companies has 
been growing. Over the period 1996-98 the annual growth rate in the life assurance sector 
amounted to approximately 30%. Over the same period, insurance companies raised 
almost three times more capital than investment trust funds and have become the largest 
non-banking financial intermediary in Poland. Despite the large number of companies, 
the insurance market is highly concentrated with Powszechny Zaklad Ubezpieczen (PZU), 
and Warta SA being the dominant players. Four companies with total market share of 
98% dominate the life assurance business: PZU Zycie, Commercial Union Poland, AIG 
Poland, and Nationale Nederlanden. At the end of 1997, the investment portfolios of 
insurance firms in Poland were composed mostly of T-bonds and T-bills (88%), with the 
value of shares not exceeding 6%. This is because of the high yield and safety generated 
by Treasury securities and also the lack of alternatives on the market, such as mortgage 
loans, mortgage bonds and corporate bonds. 
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3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1. The Data Set 
The data set used in estimation and testing consists of monthly observations spanning the 
period from January 1990 to November 2001. To measure the effect of financial 
liberalization we have selected a number of monthly indicators, ranging from money 
supplies, financial depth, and stock market indicators. Since real GDP data was not 
available for the whole sample period we have followed Gupta (1984) in using industrial 
production as a monthly indicator for economic development. The data were obtained 
from Information Bulletins and Annual Reports of the National Bank of Poland.  
To capture the monetary effects of financial liberalization, we used data on two 
different definitions of money: the narrow definition of money M0 and the broader M2. 
We also constructed a proxy variable to measure financial deepening, this is the ratio of 
credit to the private sector over the nominal value of industrial production. According to 
the McKinnon and Shaw model, the supply of credit to the private sector is ultimately 
responsible for the quantity and the quality of investment and, in turn for economic 
growth. As such, we can expect the financial deepening variable to exert a casual 
influence on the level of industrial production. We also used data on the three-month 
treasury bill interest rate, credit to non-financial sector, credit to the government, zloty 
deposits of non-financial sector in commercial banks, zloty deposits of non-financial 
sector in both the NBP and commercial banks and data on minimum reserve 
requirements. 
 To examine the connection between economic growth and the stock market we 
used two indicators of stock market development, the average market capitalization and 
the ‘turnover ratio’. The average stock market capitalization is the ratio of total value of 
the stock market over the nominal GDP. The ‘turnover ratio’ is defined as the value of 
trades of the stock market over the market capitalization. We used data on the value of 
share price index given by the Warsaw Stock Exchange Index (Warszawski Index 
Gieldowy - WIG).  
 
 
2.3. Unit Root Tests for Stationarity 
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The order of integration of each variable needs to be identified before any sensible 
econometric analysis can be undertaken and so the first step in our empirical analysis is 
to apply the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. We assume the lag length to be 4, and 
then proceeded to identify the probable order of stationarity. The results of the tests for 
all the variables and for the three alternative models: constant, constant and trend, and 
none are presented in Table 2. First we have results for their logarithmic levels and then – 
in cases were we found that the series contain a unit root – for their first differences. The 
results show that each of the series is non-stationary when the variables are defined in 
terms of levels. First-differencing the series removed the non-stationarity components in 
all series, concluding that all our series are integrated of order one.  
3.3. Cointegration Tests 
Having established the stationarity order, we moved to cointegration tests. We use the 
Engle-Granger cointegration test and the maximum likelihood method proposed by 
Johansen and Juselius. By definition two variables can be cointegrated only if they are 
integrated of the same order. In our analysis we found that all the series are integrated of 
order one. To check whether financial deepening, share prices, reserve requirements, 
money supply M0, money supply M2, turnover ratio, and average market capitalization 
are cointegrated with industrial production we performed the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test on the residuals to determine their order of integration. We assume the lag length to 
be 1. The results of the tests for the residuals for the one model are presented in Table 3. 
The ADF statistic is smaller than the critical value in all cases, therefore, the error terms 
are stationary. Hence we conclude that all financial development indicators are related in 
the long run with the industrial production series. 
Next we present further evidence supporting cointegration using the technique 
developed by Johansen (1988, 1991), and Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1992). Johansen 
and Juselius proposed a maximum-likelihood testing procedure for the number of 
cointegrating vectors that also include testing procedures for linear restrictions on the 
cointegrating parameters. Any p-dimensional vector {xt}, which follows a Gaussian VAR 
process with lag order K+1 and a drift µ can be written as: 
∆Xt = + Γ∑
=
−∆Γ
k
i
ti X
1
1 k+1 Xt-k-1 + µ + εt                                           (1) 
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where t = 1, …, T, and εt is an independently and identically distributed p-dimentional 
vector, and T is the sample size. 
The dimension of the cointegrating vector is given by the rank of matrix 
−Γk+1.When the rank is r, we can decompose Γk+1 into: 
−Γk+1 = α β’                                                              (2) 
where α and β are p × r matrices. The rows of β’ from the r represent cointegrating 
vectors. If we regard the elements of the r × 1 vector β’ Xt-k-1 as ‘error correction’ terms 
then the elements of matrix (−α) show the speed of adjustment of the dependent variables 
towards the equilibrium. Johansen (1988, 1991) proposed how to derive maximum 
likelihood estimates of α and β. He also suggested two likelihood ratio test statistics to 
determine the rank of the cointegration space. With the trace statistic, the null hypothesis 
is that there are at most r cointegrating vectors. With the maximum eigenvalue statistics, 
we test for the presence of r versus r + 1 cointegrating vectors.  
The Johansen-Juselius maximum likelihood estimates of the Trace and Maximal 
eigenvalue test statistics are shown in Table 4. In all cases we reject the null hypothesis 
that there is no cointegrating vectors in favour of the alternative hypothesis that there is 
one cointegrating vector. This implies that all our financial development indicators are 
cointegrated with industrial production, as detected earlier on by the Engle-Granger tests. 
3.4. Granger Causality Tests 
When a set of variables is stationary or cointegrated, causality tests can be conducted 
(Granger, 1988). Following the work of Granger (1969) an economic time series xt is said 
to “cause” another series yt if E(yt+1|Ωt)≠E[xt+1|Ω’t) where Ωt is the information set 
containing all available information whilst Ω’t excludes the information in past and 
present xt. 
The testing procedure for the identification of causal directions when, as is 
common in macroeconomic time series, the variables have unit roots, such as in our case, 
requires that after testing for the existence of cointegration to run Error Correctiom 
Models as follows: 
tt
n
j
jtj
m
i
itit uaxayaay ++∆+∆++=∆ −−− ∑∑ 13210 ε                            (3) 
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where εt-1=yt-1-b1xt-1, is the residual of the cointegration equation. 
This means that there are two sources of causation for y, either through the lagged 
terms ∆x or through the lagged cointegrating vector. This latter source of causation is not 
detected by the standard Granger causality test. The null hypothesis can be rejected if 
either one or more of these sources affects y (ie the parameters are different from zero). 
The hypothesis is again tested using a standard F-test. Following Granger and Lin (1995), 
the conventional Granger causality test is not valid, because two integrated series cannot 
cause each other in the long-run unless they are cointegrated. Therefore, we test for 
causality among the variables that are found to be cointegrated, using the VECM 
representations for the cointegrated variables. Results of those causality tests are 
presented in Table 5.  
According to Granger and Lin (1995) causality in the long-run exists only when 
the coefficient of the cointegrating vector is statistically significant different from zero. In 
our analysis we apply variable deletion (F-type) tests for the coefficient of the 
cointegrating vector and for the lagged values of the financial proxies for the growth of 
industrial production VECM and vice versa (testing for the validity of the supply leading 
and demand following hypothesis respectively)1.  The results reported in Table 5., show 
the coefficients of the ECM components in the VAR-ECM models with the residuals 
obtained from the Johansen Cointegration tests described above and also reports 
statistical values of F-type tests for variable deletion to check for causality in the long-run 
(ie checking for both the ECM term and the short-run dynamics in the VAR model). The 
coefficients of the ECM terms in all cases for the regressions having industrial production 
as dependent variable prove to be highly significant. By contrast, when the financial 
development proxies are dependent variables, the results show that only two out of the 
six indicators appear to be significant. This can be interpreted as evidence in favour of the 
supply-leading hypothesis. However, to be more confident about it we also have to look 
at the F-type tests. From those tests and specifically for the long-run coefficients there is 
strong evidence in favor of the supply leading hypothesis. In all cases, the causality 
direction runs from the financial proxy variable to industrial production, while the 
opposite hypothesis that industrial production causes financial development is strongly 
                                                 
1 In theoretical endogenous growth models there is no certainty about the direction with which finance 
affects growth leading to those two competing hypothesis. For more details see Asteriou and Price (2000). 
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rejected in four out of the six possible cases. For the cases of Depth and M2 the result 
suggest that there is bi-directional causality, without shedding light on which hypothesis 
should be accepted, but having the four other proxies (Turnover, Market Capitalization, 
M0, and Share Prices) showing strong evidence in support of the supply leading 
hypothesis we conclude in favour of the proposition that is mainly financial development 
that causes growth.  
 
  Similar conclusions are drawn from the results for the causality test of the dynamics 
in the VAR-ECM with the exception that the stock market financial development proxies 
do not reject the null in both cases suggesting no short-run causality at all.  In sum, we 
found that there is causal relationship and this runs from the financial development side 
to the economic development in most cases, supporting the findings of the supply-leading 
hypothesis. 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
The evidence presented in this paper supports the view that finance is a leading sector in 
the process of economic development at least in the case of Poland. Since the early 1990s 
a new financial infrastructure (with its law and institutions) has been built in Poland and 
we found strong evidence in favour of the supply-leading hypothesis, especially in the 
long-run. This indicates that the causality direction runs from all the financial 
development indicators (Turnover, Capitalization, M0, M2, Depth and Share Prices) to 
industrial production. We find that industrial production does not cause financial 
development in four cases: Turnover, Stock Market Capitalization, Share Prices and 
narrow definition of money M0. The results also suggest that the relationship between 
financial development and economic growth is bi-directional, for the cases of Depth and 
broader definition of money M2.  However this does not mean that ‘finance follows 
growth’ as the four other financial development indicators show strong evidence in 
support of the supply-leading hypothesis, hence, we favour the proposition that ‘finance 
leads to growth’ in the long-run. 
When we look the direction of  causality in the short-run the outcome is quite 
similar with the exception of the stock market development indicators. There is no short-
run causality at all. These findings should not come as a surprise, the Capital Market in 
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Poland is relatively new and relatively small. According to Czekaj and Owsiak (1999) a 
stock exchange plays an important role in an economy only once the market 
capitalization reaches around 20-25% of GDP the Polish exchange has not achieved that 
level yet. Treasury paper and shares have dominated the Polish capital market, and only 
at the end of 1990s were other financial instruments such as corporate bonds and 
derivatives were introduced. Investment funds play only a marginal role in accumulation 
of funds for the capital and money markets. In conclusion, our results support the view 
that in the case of Poland financial liberalization and reform has been an important cause 
of economic development . 
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Table 1: The Polish Banking Scene, 1993 - 1998 
End 1993 End 1996 June 1998 Types of banks 
No of 
banks 
Total net 
assets (%) 
No of 
banks 
Total net 
assets (%) 
No of 
banks 
Total net 
assets (%) 
All banks 1,740 100.0 1,475 100.0 1,329 100.0 
Commercial banks 87 93.4 81 95.4 84 95.7 
Banks with majority 
state ownership 
29 80.4 24 66.5 15 48.3 
Directly owned by the 
Treasury 
16 76.1 8 51.1 6 37.5 
Indirectly owned by 
the Treasury 
11 - 11 - 8 - 
Owned by the NBP 2 - 3 - 1 - 
Private banks 58 13.0 57 28.7 69 47.4 
Majority owned by 
Polish capital 
48 10.4 32 15.1 38 30.9 
Majority owned by 
foreign capital 
10 2.6 25 13.7 31 16.5 
Co-operative banks 1,653 6.6 1,394 4.6 1.245 4.3 
Source: Hajkiewicz-Gorecka (1999, p.97) 
 
Table 2: Augmented Dickey – Fuller Test Results 
Model: ∆yt = c1 + byt− 1 + c2t + ∑ + vktp
k
k yd −
=
∆
1
t ; H0 : b = 0; Ha : b >0 
Unit Root Tests at Levels 
Variables Constant Constant and Trend None 
Unit Root Tests at Logarithmic Levels 
Average Market Capitalization (Lcapit) -2.591* -1.845* 1.297* 
Financial Deepening (Ldepth) 0.590* -3.271* -1.511* 
Industrial Production (Lindpr) -4.067 -1.509* 4.174* 
Share Price (Lp) -3.167 -2.566* 0.940* 
Reserve Requirements (Lreserve) -0.553* -1.885* -1.237* 
Money Supply M0 (Lm0) -2.248* -0.843* 2.462* 
Money supply M2 (Lm2) -2.535* 0.270* 2.116* 
Turnover Ratio (Lturn) -1.759* -3.359 -0.683* 
Unit Root Tests at First Differences 
Average Market Capitalization (∆Lcapit) -5.486 -6.081 -4.769 
Financial Deepening (∆ Ldepth) -6.798 -7.250 -6.494 
Industrial Production (∆ Lindpr) -- -8.864 -4.791 
Share Price (∆Lp) -- -3.614 -2.947 
Reserve Requirements (∆Lreserve) -4.794 -4.839 -4.648 
Money Supply M0 (∆Lm0) -4.754 -5.231 -3.828 
Money supply M2 (∆Lm2) -5.532 -6.028 -1.397* 
Turnover Ratio (∆Lturn) -5.673 -5.741 -5.700 
* Denotes evidence of existence of unit root, at the 5% significance level the null hypothesis can not be 
rejected 
Critical values obtained are –2.88, -3.45 and –1.94 
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 Table 3: Engle-Granger Cointegration Tests results 
 
ADF Tests on Residuals of the Cointegration Equation: 
log Yt = a + b log Xt + εt 
Unit Root Tests on Residuals 
Variables None 
Residuals for depth -3.748* 
Residuals for share prices -3.386* 
Residuals for m0 -7.650* 
Residuals for m2 -7.594* 
Residuals for turnover -3.238* 
Residuals for capitalization -4.618* 
Residuals for reserve requirements -9.181* 
*Denotes significance at 5% level and rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity  
log Yt is the logarithm of industrial production 
log Xt is the logarithm of the financial development indicators presented in each row above 
 
 
Table 4: Johansen-Juselius Maximum Likelihood Cointegration TestsA 
Sample (adjusted): 1992:06 – 2001:11 
Included observations: 114 after adjusting endpoints 
Trace Maximal eigenvalue Cointegration tests of 
Industrial production 
with 
r = 0 r ≤ 1 r = 0 r ≤ 1 
 
VAR lags 
Turnover 30.99*   8.36 22.63*   8.36 4 
Capitalization 29.32*   8.98 20.34*   8.98 4 
M0 22.58*   4.42 18.33*   4.24 4 
M2 34.44*   4.87 29.57*   4.87 4 
Depth 36.41* 16.39 20.02* 16.39 4 
Share Prices 27.13*   7.77 19.37*   7.77 4 
Critical values at 95%B (Osterwald-Lenum) 
 15.41 3.76 14.07 3.76  
A Estimates correspond to a model where restricted constant is included in the cointegrating equation. 
B A small sample adjustment has been made in all the likelihood ratio statistics, equal to                                 
−2 ln Q = −(T – kp) (1 - λ*) as suggested by Reinsel and Ahn (1988).  ∑
+=
k
roi 1
ln
 20
 Table 5: Granger Causality tests on the ECM representations 
Sample (adjusted): 1992:06 – 2001:11 
Included observations: 114 after adjusting endpoints 
 
∆y/∆x 
Eigen 
vectors 
Coefficient of 
ECM term 
F-stat for 
ECM term 
F-stat for 
lagged ∆x terms 
Supply Leading Hypothesis Tests 
Ind. Prod. / Turnover 1 -0.054 
(-4.62)* 
5.687* 2.074* 
 
Ind. Prod. / Capitalization 1 -0.020 
(-3.64)* 
3.034* 0.516 
Ind. Prod. / M0 1 -0.045 
(-4.01)* 
21.237* 2.293* 
Ind. Prod. / M2 1 -0.042 
(-3.25)* 
11.096* 4.620* 
Ind. Prod. / Depth 1 -0.010 
(-2.54)* 
2.065* 5.177* 
Ind. Prod. / Share Prices 1 -0.553 
(-5.69)* 
10.994* 0.599 
Demand Following Hypothesis Tests 
Turnover / Ind. Prod. 1 -0.099 
(-1.23) 
1.684 1.785 
Capitalization / Ind. Prod.  1 -0.081 
(-1.37) 
1.643 0.552 
M0 / Ind. Prod.   1 -0.022 
(-1.83) 
1.876 0.977 
M2 / Ind. Prod.   1 -0.018 
(-5.39)* 
2.201* 3.030* 
Depth / Ind. Prod.  1 -0.036 
(-2.09)* 
3.248* 9.370* 
Share Prices / Ind. Prod.  1 -0.097 
(-0.52) 
0.024 1.788 
The null hypothesis is that of no-causality. 
* indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis for the 95% significance level. 
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